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It takes but little consideration of the words "privacy" and "broad-
casting" to recognize their inherently antithetical meanings. Privacy, of
necessity, implies the shutting out of the outside world; broadcasting con-
notes public exposure to the widest extent possible. The issue of privacy
in particular and the press in general has been commonly identified as a
conflict between the competing interests of a democratic society in the
right of the individual to be let alone and the right of the public to be
fully informed.' Though both are valued and deep-felt liberties, accom-
modation has often been difficult since long before the intrusion of tele-
vision into the American way of life
With the communications revolution in which we are now well en-
gulfed, the legitimate bounds of private confidence and public knowledge
increasingly require re-definition. There no longer appears to be any
practical way of isolating oneself from continuous and direct outside
view-and not just in the reportorial sense. Electronic apparatus has
progressed so fast and so far that the "martini olive" radio transmitter
has become old-fashioned in the face of laser-beam long-distance "bug-
ging"; parabolic microphones and telescopic cameras are standard equip-
ment to obtain unobtrusive (and often undetectable) television pick-ups.
It is clear that nobody should be surprised at being visually or aurally
recorded anywhere in public, nor feel secure against eavesdropping in his
office, in his home, or even in his own bed.'
Similar electronic marvels are occurring every day in broadcasting
science, almost too frequently to be noticed. The television wrist watch
t Member, New York Bar.
1. The right of privacy has by unanimous consent been accorded its initial con-
ceptualization in a germinal Harvard Law Review article entitled "The Right to Pri-
vacy," co-authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890). After an initial half-century of comparative neglect, legal comment and dis-
cussion has multiplied and increased over the past two decades to the point where general
periodical and text citation becomes supererogatory. Two recent books should perhaps,
however, be noted: HOFSTADTER & HoRoWITz, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964), for law-
yers; ERNST & ScHWARTZ, ParvAcY, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALoNE (1962), for the lay
reader.
2. An extremely knowledgable, and rather frightening, survey of current and fu-
ture surveillance devices and techniques is provided in a two-part article by Professor
Alan F. Westin in the Columbia Law Review entitled Science, Privacy and Freedom:
Issues and Proposals for the j97o's (pts. 1-2), 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1003, 1205 (1966). See
also Hearings on, Invasions of Privacy before the Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on, the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
pts. 1-6 (1965-1966) ; Hearings on Invasion of Privacy before a Special Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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is no longer far removed from the transistor radio; foreseeable are popu-
lar television records selling at prices not much higher than our present
phonograph long-playing records. Color television has become common-
place after many years of development; three-dimensional television may
well arrive much sooner. Communications satellites are fast enveloping
the world, permitting simultaneous and far-flung international broad-
casting; home videotape recorders will soon permit retention of missed
television programs for later viewing. In short, all broadcasts are rapidly
becoming universally and permanently available for the viewing and
listening audience.
As privacy has become less private and broadcasting more broad, it
is not surprising that privacy suits have finally begun to rival defamation
suits against broadcasters in the state and federal courts across the coun-
try.3 Their frequency would probably be even greater were it not for
the unbelievable attraction which television appearance seems to hold for
most average citizens, and the painstaking care exercised by broadcasters
in requiring their production staffs to insist upon personal releases in all
but the most clear-cut cases of communications privilege. Despite these
efforts, the kind of privacy litigation that may arise is exemplified by the
well-publicized proceedings in the New York Youssoupoff case.4
I
Rasputin Re-Interred: Youssoupoff v. CBS. The Youssoupoff
case involved two Chicago housewives who had been inspired to write an
amateur television script on the Rasputin legend for a local contest. Con-
ceiving of a half-hour vignette of the slaying of Rasputin, the authors did
most of their research at the public library. Their script corresponded
closely with their reference sources with few embellishments, as they in-
tended to present an authentic historical episode rather than merely a
heightened dramatic adaptation for television. Whether the authors be-
lieved all of the actual participants to be dead or were unfamiliar with the
possible legal risks, Prince Youssoupoff among others was featured by
name.
"If I should Die," as the television program was entitled, was pro-
duced and broadcast in Chicago over CBS station WBBM in December,
1962, on a partly sponsored basis. It was re-broadcast the following
month over the CBS station in New York City-this time without com-
mercial sponsorship. But in New York, the program apparently attracted
more notice than in Chicago; for early in 1963, Prince Youssoupoff in-
3. O'Neil, Television, Tort Law, and Federalism, 53 CALIF. L. RaV. 421, 441 (1965).
4. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d
701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inern., 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
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stituted an action against CBS under the New York statute making use
of a person's name, portrait or picture for "advertising purposes or for
purposes of trade" actionable if without written consent.'
CBS's defense was initially two-fold: foremost, that the program
fell within the well-established news and information exceptions to the
right of privacy; secondarily, that the program was not produced for
commercial purposes.
Both parties moved for summary judgment before trial; both mo-
tions were denied.6 The court found the program not dissimilar in con-
tent to the Prince's own accounts, and held that use of the dramatic form
on the program could not, as a matter of law, convert the information
privilege into privacy liability. Hence the plaintiff was not entitled to
judgment on the pleadings alone. Nevertheless, the plaintiff might be
able on trial to prove that the dramatization tended to "outrage public
opinion or decency in respects other than those produced by admitted his-
torical facts" or tended to establish commercial exploitation of the Prince's
personal life. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment was also denied.
The trial court's opinion was upheld on appeal,7 and the case went to
trial in the fall of 1965. A long three weeks of testimony ensued-most
of which was the Prince's examination and cross-examination on what
actually happened on that fateful day some fifty years earlier 5000 miles
away. Taking their lead from the court's earlier opinions, his lawyers
attempted to concentrate on two particulars in which the program had
allegedly been both misleading and embarrassing: first, that the Prince
lured Rasputin to his palace by promising that his wife would also be
present; and second, that the Prince's motivation in killing Rasputin was
personal revulsion rather than patriotic fervor. CBS endeavored to re-
fute both contentions from, among other sources, the published writings
and public statements of the Prince himself. And these two rather nar-
5. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51. It is interesting to speculate to what extent
the privacy suit against the CBS program was inspired by an earlier successful libel suit
by the Prince's wife in England against a feature motion picture on the same subject.
Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., [1934] 50 T.L.R. 581.
6. 41 Misc. 2d at 48-49, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 706-08.
7. The three-judge majority of the Appellate Division held that the moving affida-
vits did not contain sufficient evidence to determine whether the "broadcast represented
a fictionalization of the historic facts or whether the broadcast itself was for commer-
cial purposes." 19 App. Div. 2d at 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 1. Two other judges were of
the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover since "the immunity granted in re-
spect to informative matter does not extend to dramatized or fictionalized versions of
the event reported"-but that the issue of damages nevertheless remained open for trial,
so that summary judgment was not an appropriate remedy. 19 App. Div. 2d at 866, 244
N.Y.S.2d at 2. Also note that defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint and for a
directed verdict were subsequently denied by the trial court. 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265
N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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row points gradually became the focal issues in what had begun as a much
broader proceeding.
The jury returned a verdict for CBS-principally, it can be pre-
sumed, on the basis of the program's historical accuracy, although per-
haps also from a belief that the Prince had suffered no compensable em-
barrassment from his prominent depiction on the CBS program.
Fact-Fiction: Spahn v. Messner. The rationale of the Youssoupoff
opinions before trial was clearly an adaptation for television of the "fact-
fiction" test previously developed in the New York courts with respect to
print media. The theory seems fairly simple and straightforward. Factual
reports of current or historical events have been considered to be infor-
mational and educational, and therefore to override the privacy right of
any individual involved. Fictional accounts have been assumed to be
aimed at entertainment alone and to be inspired by those commercial
motives against which the right of privacy is intended to be a protection.
On these assumptions, the judicial inquiry can be limited to determining
whether a given publication is factual or fictional in character in order
to assess liability.'
The fact-fiction formula was consistently applied throughout the
proceedings in another recent New York case, Spahn v. Messner.' War-
ren Spahn, a pitcher for the then Milwaukee Braves, brought suit against
the New York publisher of a juvenile book entitled, appropriately enough,
"The Warren Spahn Story." Spahn's argument was that although the
book was generally complimentary, it was published without his consent-
and although it generally reflected his biography, it contained specific
incidents that were either highly sensationalized or substantially untrue.
In the Spaln case, the New York courts uniformly held on trial and
appeal that, compared with the actual circumstances, there were enough
discrepancies to hold the book fictional rather than factual. Conse-
quently, despite the fact that Spahn was admittedly a very public figure
whose name and biography might not have been entitled to privacy if
accurately publicized, the publisher was held not to be entitled to exemp-
tion from the New York right of privacy act. Spahn was therefore
awarded an injunction and $10,000 in damages.
But what was inherently involved in the Spahn case was not so much
8. Origin of the New York fact-fiction distinction has been attributed as far back
as Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913). For perceptive analysis
and persuasive criticism, see Note, Right of Privacy v. Free Press: Suggested Resolu-
tion of Conflicting Values, 23 IND. L.J. 179 (1953).
9. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221
N.E.2d 543 (1966), vacated and remanded, 87 S. Ct. 1706 (1967).
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the right of "privacy" as the right of "publicity"--that is to say, the right
of a celebrity to control the commercial exploitation of his personality."
The New York courts have been reluctant to recognize any such property
right standing on its own, but have been willing at times to find ways to
include this type of commercialization within the "purposes of trade"
language of the New York Civil Rights Law, so long as true educational
and informational publications are not affected. As was said at one
stage of the appeals in the Spahn case:
It is true, as it ought to be, that a public figure is subject to
being exposed in a factual biography, even one which contains
inadvertent or superficial inaccuracies. But surely, he should
not be exposed, without his control, to biographies not limited
substantially to the truth."1
Unfortunately, this "fact-fiction" analysis is not always easy to
match up in the earlier New York decisions, even when closely con-
temporaneous. For example, in 1950 a "true" comic book was held to be
privileged,'2 although in 1951 an allegedly accurate article in a "true"
detective magazine was held subject to possible liability. 3 At about the
same time, an admittedly enriched and possibly embarrassing biography
of Maestro Koussevitsky was held exempt from injunction, 4 while what
was probably a less contrived magazine article on a World War II pilot
was held actionable. 5 And in the California courts, it is interesting to
contrast two motion-picture cases: Stryker v. Republic Pictures," where
an ex-marine hero could not prevail against use of his characterization in
a movie entitled "The Sands of Iwo Jima," and Melvin v. Reid, where
a reformed prostitute successfully had sued over use of her notorious
past as the plot for a feature film.
Nevertheless, the "fact-fiction" test was readily embraced once again
by the highest New York court when it ruled on the final appeal of
Spah v. Messner last October. In its opinion, moreover, the New York
Court of Appeals pointed to another New York case, Hill v. Hayes, then
10. Cf. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960).
11. 23 App. Div. 2d at 221, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
12. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119(1950).
13. Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
14. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Ct), affd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
15. Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1950).
16. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 196, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
17. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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pending for some time on appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court."8
Constitutional Considerations: Hill v. Hayes. Early in January of
this year, the Supreme Court finally handed down its decision reversing
Hill v. Hayes, in Time Inc. v. Hill." With one fell swoop, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion for the majority undercut the entire "fact-fiction" hypothe-
sis on first and fourteenth amendment grounds, leaving the New York
Civil Rights Law with markedly diminished application.
The Hill case involved a 1955 Life Magazine feature that compared
an admittedly fictional novel, play, and movie-all by Joseph Hayes and
called "The Desperate Hours"-with a celebrated incident three years
earlier in which escaped convicts held the Hill family captive in their
Pennsylvania home for some twenty hours. In reporting on the opening
of the play, Life went so far as to photograph scenes reenacted by the
cast in the actual Hill house (from which the Hill family had in the mean-
time moved to Connecticut in what may be presumed to have been a
search for anonymity); it also described "The Desperate Hours" as re-
flecting the Hills' unpleasant experience, when in fact there were essential
differences (including the family's treatment at the hands of the
convicts)."
With these adverse aspects of artificiality, commerciality and mis-
representation present, it was easy for the New York courts to uphold
the Hills' claim and award substantial damages to the family. Life's sen-
sationalized approach was found to be aimed primarily at increased sales
of the magazine and advertising for the play, and so was viewed as not
serving any bona fide news or public interest purpose legitimately ex-
empt from privacy actions.
Bringing to bear the same principles that guided its decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan," however, the Supreme Court reversed. Ex-
pressly disagreeing with the New York Court of Appeals in Spahn v.
Messner," the majority opinion is direct and forthright:
18. Hill v. Hayes, 27 Misc. 2d 863, 207 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 18
App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965),
prob. juris. noted, 382 U.S. 936 (1965), reargunent ordered, 384 U.S. 995 (1966). For
an early evaluation of the New York decisions and thoughtful presentation of the pos-
sible constitutional issues involved, see Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 24
FORDXAm L. Rzv. 553 (1966).
19. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
20. The Hill family incident occurred in the fall of 1952; the Hayes' novel was
published in the spring of 1953; the Life picture article appeared early in 1955 just be-
fore the Broadway opening of the play; the motion picture was released in 1956 after
the beginning of the Hill law suit.
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Although the first amendment issue had been pointedly raised on final appeal
in Spahn v. Messnwr, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished New York Times v.
Sullivan on the basis that it was applicable only to suits against public officials for off i-
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We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and
press preclude the application of the New York statute to re-
dress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of
proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.23
Fictional or factual, false or true, commercially or altruistically inspired,
therefore, a right of privacy action against a published story, report,
article or other account is henceforth constitutionally barred not only if
substantially accurate or inadvertently inexact, but even if materially and
injuriously incorrect through indisputable lack of research care. Any-
thing more than liability limited to calculated falsehood, the Supreme
Court has held, would illegally impair the exercise of the freedoms of
speech and press.
II
In reversing the Hill case, the Supreme Court has undoubtedly
cleared a wider swath of journalistic freedom for television as well as
the rest of the American press. No longer need broadcasters be exces-
sively apprehensive about being able to prove historical or reportorial ac-
curacy to the last detail in order to avoid the appearance of fictionaliza-
tion or sensationalism. In effect, television has been relieved of the fact-
fiction strait-jacket sought to be imposed in the Yowsoupoff case--al-
ways an especially uncomfortable fit for the broadcaster for a variety of
obvious reasons.
First, accuracy of character and situation portrayal has never been
a reliable standard for distinguishing between entertainment and infor-
mation. Television fiction usually involves dramatization, but dramati-
zation is not necessarily inconsistent with fact. Television non-fiction
is most often presented in a documentary format, but all documentary
producers must select between differing interpretations by historians and
other experts in presenting what is hopefully an objective program. The
Youssoupoff case itself indicates the pitfalls that lie in the path of the
most conscientious researcher of historical material for television pro-
duction.
Second, commercial sponsorship is an equally unreliable index upon
cial conduct. judge Keating, for the unanimous court said: "The free speech which is
encouraged and essential to the operation of a healthy government is something quite
different from an individual's attempt to enjoin the publication of a fictitious biography
of him. No public interest is served by protecting the disseminator of the latter. We
perceive no constitutional infirmities in this respect." 18 N.Y.2d at 329, 221 N.E2d
at 546.
23. 385 U.S. at 387-88. On appeal, the Supreme Court specifically vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals "for further con-
sideration in the light of Time, Inc. v. Hill."
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which to judge program content or purpose. Television advertising is not
limited to amusement programs, and not all unsponsored programs are
informational in character. A factual biography of a popular hero may
be motivated by greater commercial reasons than a fictional sketch of a
lesser figure; a fully sponsored documentary film may be more profitable
than a partially sponsored dramatic episode. Besides, even when broad-
cast on a purely public service basis, almost all programs are surrounded
(and perhaps interrupted) by so-called "spot" advertisements not very
different from sponsor messages.24 Commercial television invariably in-
volves considerations of profit; educational television is always non-
profit by definition-but certainly neither should be considered suscep-
tible to or immune from privacy claims on that basis alone.
Third, fact and fiction are too often indistinguishable by the tele-
vision public. The immediate and intimate impact of the television pic-
ture, the widely varied nature and format of television programs in ad-
jacent time periods, the ever-expanding range of television production
and broadcast techniques, the immense and multifarious television audi-
ence, the domestic interruptions and channel-switching that usually at-
tend homeviewing-all these make it difficult for the viewer to determine
what programs are "live" or recorded, actual or reenacted, impromptu or
scripted, news or history, drama or documentary. The characteristic mis-
impressions of television viewers about what they see are as notorious
as their unending capacity to sit before the television tube.25
Last, the fact-fiction line is frequently blurry in television produc-
tion. Documentary film producers have for some time been exploring
new dramatic techniques to re-create historic events and report on current
happenings. Dramatic programs have often proved most successful
when using documented dialogue verbatim. The combined dramatic-
actuality techniques of the latest "cinema-verit6" films and "non-fiction"
novels are indicative of the way in which television programs too are
increasingly becoming intermixtures of fact and fiction, of information
and entertainment-even, as the Supreme Court has prophesied, of amuse-
ment and propaganda.2"
In short, the way taken in the Youssoupoff case-searching into the
24. Even fully "sustaining" broadcasts have been found to be commercially inspired.
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 493 (W.D. Pa.
1938) ; cf. Note, Privacy Invasion by Telecast, 15 FED. B.J. 186, 188 (1955).
25. Television lawyers are still haunted by the Orson Welles "Martian invasion"
radio broadcast and the spate of lawsuits that followed almost thirty years ago. Hence
the usual network practice, through subtitles and superimpositions, introductions and ex-
planations, to explain the nature of programs, segments or sequences which might pos-
sibly be subject to misunderstanding.
26. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1947).
380
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murky past for minute details surrounding myth-like events-seems at
best to have been a slippery road through swampy land. Far firmer foot-
ing has now been provided by the Supreme Court in the Hill case: Legal
liability has been constitutionally limited to intentional or reckless falsifi-
cation of fact.
It is interesting to note, moreover, that subjecting the privacy right
to constitutional limitations represents not just the views of the five-
judge majority of the Supreme Court. Even the dissenters in the Hill
case did not disagree with the interposition of a constitutional barrier
around inaccurate reports so long as reasonable journalistic efforts are
made, irrespective of possible harm to private individuals. Justice Har-
lan would apparently be willing to premise liability on "negligence" alone;
Justice Fortas, with whom Justices Warren and Clark agreed, in taking
issue with the majority about whether the Hill jury's findings amounted
to "recklessness,"2 7 also indicated an underlying predilection in favor of
press over privacy.
Going further than the majority opinion, moreover, Justices Doug-
las and Black in their concurring opinions saw the interests of a free
press precluding any privacy suit irrespective of purposeful falsification,
intentional injury, or outright malice. Justice Black viewed the privacy
right as judge-made and certainly not in a class with basic constitutional
freedoms; Justice Douglas, who first explicitly enunciated a constitu-
tional right of privacy in the Connecticut birth control opinion,28 simply
saw no individual privacy in connection with a public event.
For none of the nine Supreme Court Justices, then, has the emphasis
on the fact-fiction test in the Youssoupoff and Spahn cases been justifi-
able. Whatever the right of "privacy" or "publicity" may be, it cannot
lead to legal recovery for the use of an individual's name, picture,
or biography in print or through the air waves in the absence of proven
malicious intent or undoubted "recklessness" in the false publication of
damaging material of public interest. In a communications media such
as television, which is subject to such intense public scrutiny and close
federal regulation, a finding of intentional or reckless mendacious harm
should be rare indeed. 9
27. It is apparently in the hope of proving such "recklessness" in the Life article
that former Vice-President Nixon, who argued for the Hill family before the Supreme
Court, has announced his intention to seek a new trial in the New York courts. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1967, p. 14, col. 2.
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. O'Neil, Television, Tort Law and Federalism, 53 CAaiF. L. RP. 421, 464
(1965) : "Under the general rubric of 'public interest,' the FCC undoubtedly has power




The Hill case need not, however, be construed to have banished all
considerations of privacy from broadcasting. In refusing to invalidate
the New York statute altogether, for example, the Supreme Court has
permitted its continued application to the unauthorized use of an indi-
vidual's name or picure for product endorsement or other advertising
use."0 Since no public informational purpose is served and private profit
alone is concerned, commercial endorsements can properly be statutorily
required to be dependent on personal permission. Even for Justices
Douglas and Black, there would appear to be no constitutional inhibition
on as much absolute liability for trade advertising as absolute freedom
for press content is required by constitutional mandate. The omni-
present television commercial, therefore, continues to be a potential source
of privacy suits.
The Supreme Court's footnotes have also explicitly left the door
open to further consideration of two other regions of the privacy area:
(1) the extent of permissible protection of "intimate personal details of
an embarrassing nature,"'" and (2) the unlicensed publication of recorded
material surreptitiously obtained." While both are somewhat related in
their emphasis on personal integrity, differences in immediacy and im-
port might well lead to different approaches by state courts without fear
of constitutional transgression."3
The appropriate extent of the private life of a public figure in our
society is almost as ill-defined as the appropriate limits on public exposure
of a private individual. The Kennedy-Manchester dispute earlier this
year points up how innately subjective is the judgment of what is per-
sonal and what is historical about a public official; scandal-sheet exploi-
tation of crime victims and others involuntarily in the news is not easy to
distinguish from standard stories in our daily newspapers and weekly
magazines. As pointed out in the Hill opinion, most law suits in which
the issue has been raised give lip-service to the principle of personal pri-
30. Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law were, of course, spe-
cifically aimed at unauthorized advertising use when enacted in 1903. In Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 444 (1902), the New York Court
of Appeals had refused protection against use of the plaintiff's picture in defendant's
advertisement on the ground that no privacy right existed absent state legislative
enactment.
31. 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
32. Id. at 384 n.9.
33. Emphasizing the importance of similar footnote reservations by the Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co.,
362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
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vacy, but then hold for the defendant on the ground of public privilege.3 4
Outside of the Hill case's perimeters encompassing "newsworthy
people and events," however, it would not be unreasonable to insist upon
responsible reporting in this connection. For so long as responsible re-
porting includes the twin requirements of professional research of con-
tent and reasonable relationship of subject-matter, there should be neither
undue restriction on publication nor too broad an invasion of privacy."
Such a standard would also exclude liability for the coincidental use of a
private name and address in a broadcast or an article, or for the incidental
inclusion of a bystander in a film or photograph,3" without in any way
inhibiting recourse by a truly injured individual to the remedies for defa-
mation, unfair competition, or copyright infringement.a"
Secret surveillance--aural or visual-is in a rather different cate-
gory. To subject a private individual in person, without his knowledge
or consent, to an almost limitless television or radio audience, "live" or
by recording, is surely an unjustifiable violation of privacy unless an in-
disputable and unequivocal "news" item is involved. The Federal Com-
munications Commission last year promulgated regulations against the
use of radio and television devices for eavesdropping purposes ;" the un-
34. The best known example is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), dismissing a privacy action against a New
Yorker magazine profile about the disappointing adulthood of a child genius.
Some courts have tended to be more sympathetic towards subjects of reprinted
photographs rather than merely of written text-either where originally unauthorized
or taken without consent for news purposes valid at the time. Leverton v. Curtis, 192
F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d
133 (1945); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); see Note,
The Right of Privacy in News Photographs, 144 VA. L. REv. 1303 (1958).
35. Cf. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 927 (1963); see also Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection:
Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAY. L. REv. 107, 146 (1963). Note that the
requirement of "reasonable relationship and relevancy," even where the report is con-
cededly factual, has already been suggested by commentators and courts. Silver, Pri-
vacy and the First Anidment, 24 FoRDEAm L. REv. 553 (1966); Lahiri v. Daily Mir-
ror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). As to the standard of pro-
fessional research required to avoid liability, Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967), is indicative of
the probable judicial approach.
36. With respect to name coincidences, compare Krieger v. Popular Publications,
Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1937), with Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc.
822, 277 N.Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935). With respect to picture inclusions, compare
Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1932),
aff'd, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933), with Buzinski v. DoAll Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d
191, 175 N.E2d 577 (1961), and Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1955).
37. That those types of actions also are subject to constitutional standards has been
indicated with respect to defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and with re-
spect to unfair competition in the twin cases Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
38. FCC RUIEs, Part 2, Subpart H, § 2.701, and Part 15, Subpart A, § 15.11, and
Subpart E, § 15.220, 31 Fed. Reg. 3400 (1966) (effective April 8, 1966).
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authorized interception and divulgence of wired or wireless communica-
tions had long previously been prohibited by federal statute. 9 Local ac-
tion against electronic eavesdropping has been taken by both state courts
and state legislatures." It seems essential to the democratic process that
any identifiable results of such invidious activity should be kept off the
broadcast air as well.
The Hill decision, it is submitted, does not mean that the right of
privacy no longer prohibits the undesirable use of radio and television
tapes, films, or other recordings without consent in all but the clearest
newscasting circumstances. True, where outright commercial use is not
involved, the concept of consent might be rather flexible: in most cases,
it should be implied from awareness without objection or exposure with-
out reservation ;41 once given, it should be considered irrevocable and sub-
ject only to restrictions expressed at the time;42 and it should normally
be assumed to be a condition of appearance at public gatherings or places
so long as no undue emphasis is made or confidentiality breached.43  But
the personal option to refuse to be the subject of scrutiny or recording
must always be carefully safeguarded if the right of privacy is to be
meaningful in our society in the future. Here the privacy right more
closely reflects the considerations of Griswold v. Connecticut than those
of New York Times v. Sullivan, and it is fo be hoped that the distinction
will be appropriately marked by the Supreme Court when the earliest
opportunity arises.
39. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
40. FCC Report and Order, Docket No. 15262, at 3 (Feb. 25, 1966).
41. Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953) ; cf. Cohen
v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320 (Cal. App. 1950) ; see Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746
(E.D.N.Y. 1936); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 25 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306
(1949). But see Durgom v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214
N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (citing explicit New York statute requiring written
consent).
42. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 251
F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958) ; cf. Sinclair v. Postal Tel. &
Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Dahl v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 12 Misc.
2d 573, 166 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd men., 183 N.Y.S.2d 992 (App. Div.
1959). But see Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692, 271 N.Y. Supp. 187
(Sup. Ct. 1933).
43. Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044 (Cal. Super. Ct., July
26, 1949) ; cf. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1951) ; Gill
v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 42 SPRING 1967 Number 3






Articles and Book Review Editor Managing Editor
ELLIOTT ABRUTYN ROBERT V. KIXMILLER
Symposium Editor Research Editor
MICHAEL W. OWEN SALLY M. HARTFIELD
Note Editors
ALAN N. BAKER MICHAEL S. MAURER
PHILIP L. CARSON JAY G. TAYLOR
ALAN N. BAKER JEFFREY J. KENNEDY
RICHARD J. DARKO JOHN T. LORENZ
STEPHEN A. HARLOW THOMAS L. SCHUESSLER
FREDERICK F. THORNBURG
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
FREDERICK REED DICKERSON: A.B. 1931, Williams College; LL.B. 1934, Harvard
Univ.; LL.M. 1939, J.S.D. 1950, Columbia Univ.; Professor of Law, Indiana Univ.
JOHN D. CALAMARI: A.B. 1942, LL.B. 1947, Fordham Univ.; LL.M. 1950, New
York Univ.; Professor of Law, Fordham Univ.
JosEPH M. PmuLo: A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1955, Cornell Univ.; Associate Professor of
Law, Fordham Univ.
THE HONORABLE MR. JUSTICE SCARMAN: M.A. 1934, Oxford Univ.; LL.D. 1966,
Exeter Univ.; Chairman of the Law Commission.
EUGENE N. ALEINIKOFF: B.A. 1940, College of the City of New York; LL.B. 1943,
Columbia Univ.; General Counsel of National Educational Television and Radio Center.
ROBERT -FAULKNER: B.A. 1956, Dartmouth; M.A. 1962, Oxford, 1960, Univ. of
Chicago; Ph.D. 1964, Univ. of Chicago; Assistant Professor, Princeton Univ.
DONALD L. A. KFRsoN: A.B. 1955, LL.B. 1961, Univ. of California; Member of the
California Bar.
Copyright @ 1967 by the Trustees of Indiana University
